Neurodiversity in Public Schools: A Critique of Special Education in America by Vishwanath, Pallavi M.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 
Volume 47 
Number 4 Summer 2020 Article 6 
Summer 2020 
Neurodiversity in Public Schools: A Critique of Special Education 
in America 
Pallavi M. Vishwanath 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pallavi M. Vishwanath, Neurodiversity in Public Schools: A Critique of Special Education in America, 47 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 595 (2020). 
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol47/iss4/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu. 
D - VISHWANATH_CLQ_V47-4 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2020 8:47 AM 
 
[595] 
Neurodiversity in Public Schools:  
A Critique of Special Education in America 
by PALLAVI M. VISHWANATH* 
Introduction 
“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and 
local governments.”1  If equal educational opportunity were a constitutional 
right, then all students could have the opportunity to maximize their 
potential.  Alternatively, the lack of cultural, political, and legal recognition 
of intelligence pluralism results in lost human potential and societal 
contribution.2  When a society only considers specific ways of learning to be 
“typical,” it implies that limited ways of cognitive performance, reasoning, 
socialization, perception of stimuli, and emotional processing give people 
competitive benefits in education and the marketplace.3  Neurodiverse 
expressions of intelligence and cognition are consequently “atypical,” 
stigmatized, and labeled as disabilities.  Individuals with disabilities, or 
neurodiverse abilities, are often excluded from social and civil citizenship 
because they do not have equal opportunity to maximize their potential.4  As 
a result, societies are harmed because there is great loss in human potential.5 
Atypical brain structure and functioning are quantitatively and 
qualitatively relevant to a variety of systems, which not only affects 
individuals but also democracy as a whole.6  Millions of adolescents 
diagnosed with a wide range of neurodiverse conditions ranging from 
neurodevelopmental disorders to learning disabilities will transition into 
 
       * University of California, Hastings, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2020; Master in the Study of Law, 
University of California, Hastings 2016; Bachelor of Arts, Saint Louis University 2014.  The author 
would like to thank Andrea Lollini for his helpful comments and advice for this Note.  This Note 
is dedicated to Derrick High and the Valley Children’s Hospital. 
 1.  Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).  
 2.  Areto A. Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to Provide Public 
Education, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 64 (2011). 
 3.  Andrea Lollini, Brain Equality: Legal Implications of Neurodiversity in a Comparative 
Perspective, 51 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 69, 132. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Imoukhuede, supra note 2. 
 6.  Lollini, supra note 3, at 83. 
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adulthood over the next decade, which significantly impacts healthcare and 
social security systems.7  People with learning disabilities typically struggle 
with underemployment and face additional exposure to the criminal justice 
system because of the lack of equal education.8  Accordingly, 
misunderstanding and excluding neurodiverse individuals is detrimental to 
societies on multiple levels. 
Public education is the means for governments to ensure that all people 
enter the marketplace with foundational tools to effectively compete in 
society despite unequal advantages and intergenerational factors outside an 
individual’s control.9  Inequality in education services often excludes 
individuals with neurodiverse traits from social and civil citizenship.  For 
instance, a majority of incarcerated youth in America have learning and 
emptional disabilities.10  Analyzing special education in public schools 
reveals how a society values the potential of and contribution from 
individuals with neurodiverse traits or disabled students. 
Although the United States statutorily establishes public education for 
all students, education is not considered a fundamental right under the United 
States Constitution.  Instead, education seems to be treated as a service rather 
than a right.  Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, students must only be provided with access to public education 
services.  This standard leaves the American government with an ambiguous 
duty to provide students with services that subjectively benefit individual 
students differently.  Further, this standard allows separate, unequal, and 
different educational opportunities for students with disabilities.11  Although 
the United States has passed federal, state, and local laws in attempts to 
protect students from discrimination, these laws are not synonymous with 
developing every students’ potential.  This is because racial or gender 
discrimination receive stricter levels of review than disability discrimination.  
As a result, “equal” education for disabled students drastically varies by 
region, time period, and forum.12 
Canada, on the other hand, recognizes education as a constitutional right 
and renounces the “separate but equal” inquiry for disabled students.13  This 
is because Canada finds a governmental duty to meaningfully maximize 
 
 7.  Lollini, supra note 3, at 82. 
 8.  Candace Cortiella & Sheldon H. Horowitz, The State of Learning Disabilities: Facts, 
Trends and Emerging Issues, NAT’L CTR. FOR LEARNING DISABILITIES (2014).  
 9.  Imoukhuede, supra note 2, at 48. 
 10.  Nat’l Council on Disability, Breaking the School-to-Prison Pipeline for Students with 
Disabilities, June 18, 2015, at 6. 
 11.  Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 
199 (1982). 
 12.  Perry A. Zirkel, The autism case law: Administrative and Judicial Rulings, 17 FOCUS ON 
AUTISM AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 91(2002). 
 13.  Moore v. British Columbia (Education), [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 (Can.). 
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every student’s potential regardless of disability.14  Canada also 
acknowledges that wasted human potential harms both individual students 
and society at large.  The contrasting governmental commitments to provide 
equal education in America and Canada demonstrate opposite duties to 
maximize students’ potentials. 
This Note reasons that a country or democracy is most benefitted when 
there is a recognized governmental duty to maximize the potential of every 
student via public education.  Further, it exposes how a difference in 
governmental duty to provide equal education drastically affects students’ 
dignity and potential.  Part I describes the history of the American public 
education system.  Part II explains the development of special education in 
the United States and the ambiguous governmental duty to educate American 
students.  Part III discusses Canadian case law regarding special education 
to show that providing access to equal educational opportunities promotes a 
healthy democracy.  Ultimately, this Note argues that in defining education 
as a right, rather than a service, America can better establish equality in 
public education and foster the human potential of all students to become 
productive members of society. 
I. Public Education in America: Unequal Opportunities 
The right to education is not a fundamental right under the United States 
Constitution, but Congress has passed statutes with the goal of creating a 
governmental duty to provide students with an education.15  American courts 
seem to interpret these vague statutes to find that education services are 
provided successfully unless there is an obvious due process violation.  
Although Congress amended education acts with the intent to be more 
inclusive of students with disabilities, there are great discrepancies in courts’ 
interpretations of equal access to public education and assessments of the 
appropriate levels of inclusion.16  These discrepancies are better understood 
by analyzing students’ access to public education generally before 
examining the rippling consequences on students with disabilities. 
The United States Supreme Court held that education is not a 
fundamental right in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez.17  Parents of poor, minority students attending schools financed 
by a low property tax base brought a class action against the school district 
in the District Court for the Western District of Texas.18  Plaintiffs argued 
 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 179. 
 16.  Wendy F. Hensel, Sharing the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity Under the IDEA, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 1147 (2007). 
 17.  San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). 
 18.  Id. at 4–5. 
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that education is an implied right because education is essential to effectively 
exercise First Amendment rights and intelligently utilize the right to vote.19  
They further alleged that disparity in public education funding and quality of 
education among school districts violated their guaranteed equal rights under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20  The District 
Court found the financing scheme unconstitutional because the court 
recognized education as a fundamental right; however, the Supreme Court 
struck down the lower court’s approach.21  The Supreme Court explained 
that education is not within the limited category of constitutionally protected 
rights, and even if it was, the Texas education system did not fail to provide 
the basic minimal skills necessary for that purpose.22  Further, the Court 
found that plaintiffs’ equal protection rights were not violated because the 
tax scheme assured a basic education for every child in the state.23 
In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court maintained that separate 
learning institutions for students based on sex and opportunities are 
constitutional so long as there is “substantial” equality.24  In that case, the 
Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”) was the only higher public education 
institution in Virginia for military leadership.25  VMI utilized an 
“adversative” method to instill physical and mental discipline in its cadets 
and had a male-only admissions policy.26  The United States sued the 
Commonwealth of Virginia alleging an equal protection violation for 
maintaining a college exclusively for males.27  The United States District 
Court for the Western District of Virginia ruled for the Commonwealth, but 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded and tasked Virginia with 
creating a remedial plan.28  Virginia created a parallel program for women 
that did not use the adversarial method, but instead used a less-rigorous, 
nonmilitary, cooperative training program to account for perceived 
differences in learning styles between men and women.29  This program 
lacked funding, prestige, and the graduates would “not have the advantage 
afforded by a VMI degree.”30 
The parallel program for women was built on generic and outdated 
assumptions about the sexes, which resulted in inferior educational methods 
 
 19.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. 
 20.  Id. at 16. 
 21.  Id. at 6. 
 22.  Id. at 37. 
 23.  Id. at 49. 
 24.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 554 (1996). 
 25.  Id. at 519. 
 26.  Id. at 520. 
 27.  Id. at 523. 
 28.  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 525. 
 29.  Id. at 527. 
 30.  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 527. 
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and lack of prestige.  The Supreme Court found that this bifurcated approach 
resulted in an unacceptable and unconstitutional disparity.31  Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist clarified in his Concurring Opinion that the Court’s 
rationale supported separate but equal institutions separated on the basis of 
sex if the same quality of education were offered at each institution.32  The 
Court, therefore, ruled that separation in education is inherently unequal 
when a protected class such as race is concerned, but this is not necessarily 
true when a quasi-protected class such as gender is concerned.33  This narrow 
holding, therefore, did not find that separation in education was unequal and 
unconstitutional in all applications, but only in limited situations. 
Unlike the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore v. British Columbia,34 
the Supreme Court of the United States failed to reject a “separate but equal” 
inquiry.35  The Supreme Court of the United States only considered the 
exclusion of women unconstitutional because there was no “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” for their exclusion.36  The decisions in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez and United States v. Virginia 
reveal how America justifies unequal educational opportunities: education is 
not a right and separate is not inherently unequal.  As a result, American 
public schools institutionally isolate vulnerable students who have atypical 
cognitive performance or learning styles.37 
The American approach lacks an understanding of neurodiversity or 
cognitive pluralism because it labels students as typical and atypical learners.  
Labeling atypical students as “disabled” substantially limits their ability to 
reach their maximum potential because of the disparity in the quality and 
adequacy of the public education they receive.38  Despite America’s progress 
in passing federal legislation to establish equal public education, disparity 
endures.  Because the Supreme Court of the United States does not inherently 
reject a “separate but equal” justification and does not consider education a 
fundamental right, special education is a secondary service within American 
public education. 
 
 
 31.  Id. at 553–54. 
 32.  Id. at 565 (Rehnquist, W., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 33.  Id. at 533–34. 
 34.  See infra pp. 18-20. 
 35.  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 564 (Rehnquist, W., concurring) (“. . . it is not the exclusion of 
women that violates the Equal Protection Clause, but the maintenance of an all-men school without 
providing any—much less a comparable—institution for women”). 
 36.  Id. at 524. 
 37.  Hensel, supra note 16, at 1147–48. 
 38.  Id. 
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II. Special Education in America:  
The Refusal to Maximize Potential 
Before Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act (“EAHCA”), there were more than eight million children with 
disabilities, most of whom were excluded from any sort of educational 
opportunity.39  In the early 1970s, the decisions in Pennsylvania Association 
for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania40 and 
Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia41 recognized the 
exclusion of disabled students from public education as a violation of due 
process rights and equal protection under the law.  In 1975, Congress passed 
the EAHCA to require that public schools accepting federal funds provide 
equal access to education.42  In 1990, Congress reauthorized the EAHCA and 
renamed it the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).43  The 
United States Supreme Court first addressed the government’s duty to 
provide equal education to students with disabilities in Board of Education 
of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley.44  Later, the 
Supreme Court clarified the governmental duty to provide a free and 
appropriate education to disabled students in Endrew F. v. Douglas County 
School District Re-1.45 
A.  EAHCA: Establishing Public Education for Disabled Students 
In 1971, the District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held 
that no child shall be denied access to free public education based on their 
disability.46  In PARC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,47 plaintiffs, 
parents of thirteen intellectually disabled students deemed to be uneducable, 
argued that Pennsylvania violated their equal protection rights by refusing to 
provide them with a free public education.48  This case ultimately affirmed 
that equality in education requires the government to place each disabled 
child in a free public program of education and training appropriate to the 
child’s capacity because all disabled students “are capable of benefiting from 
a program of education and training.”49  The Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 
 39.  Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 1 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 
189 (2006). 
 40.  Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (1971) 
(hereinafter “PARC”). 
 41.  Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 42.  Hensel, supra note 16, at 1148. 
 43.  Id. at 1156. 
 44.  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192. 
 45.  Endrew F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 991 (2017). 
 46.  PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1258. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1265. 
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was the first court to recognize that students with disabilities are entitled to 
a public school education.50 
Months later, in Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the District 
of Columbia must provide children of school age with a free and suitable 
publicly-supported education, regardless of the child’s mental, physical, or 
emotional disability or impairment.51  The Court also held that lack of 
funding is not a justifiable reason to exclude a child from public education.52  
In Mills, seven students with disabilities were denied education because they 
were classified as having behavioral issues.53  The District Court for the 
District of Columbia held that denying plaintiffs and their class publicly 
supported education and excluding them from schooling without review 
violated the due process of law.54  The court reasoned that excluding children 
with disabilities from the public school system also denied them equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, which is a component of the 
due process that binds the District under the Fifth Amendment.55  The court 
cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education to reason 
that: “[c]ompulsory school attendance laws . . . demonstrate our recognition 
of the importance of education to our democratic society. . . .  Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which 
must be made on equal terms.56 
Similar to its analysis in United States v. Virginia, the Court did not 
reject the notion of a “separate but equal” approach.57  It did, however, 
find that the Board of Education shall not exclude any child from a regular 
public school unless the child is provided adequate alternative 
educational services suited to the child’s needs, and a constitutionally 
adequate prior review of the child’s “status, progress, and the adequacy 
of any educational alternative.”58 
Neither PARC nor Mills clarified what equal education looked like for a 
neurodiverse student population.  Neither court went further than 
acknowledging that disabled children’s due process and equal protection 
rights were violated when they had no access to public schools.  Although 
both PARC and Mills held that disabled children must have access to 
adequate and publicly supported education, neither required a specific 
 
 50.  Gordon, supra note 39, at 193. 
 51.  Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 52.  Id. at 876. 
 53.  Id. at 868. 
 54.  Id. at 875. 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 57.  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 525. 
 58.  Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878. 
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standard level of education.59  Congress attempted to address this ambiguity 
by passing the EAHCA in 1975 which guaranteed access to public schools, 
support, and necessary services to achieve a “free[,] appropriate public 
education” (“FAPE”) to all children.60 
B.  Developing FAPE in EAHCA and IDEA 
In 1990, the United States Congress reauthorized and renamed 
EAHCA61 to IDEA.62  Like EAHCA, IDEA offered federal funding to assist 
States in educating children with disabilities.  Still, IDEA provides no 
substantive guidance regarding the level of education for students with 
disabilities.63  Congress’ intent can, therefore, be better understood from 
examining IDEA’s development. 
In 1997, significantly new amendments to IDEA were passed.  First, 
state and local education agencies (“LEAs”), such as a public board of 
education, were to assess and ensure the effectiveness of efforts to educate 
children with disabilities.  Second, IDEA emphasized access to the general 
curriculum in an attempt to guarantee full inclusion with general education 
students.  Third, discipline standards and procedures incorporated the use of 
behavioral assessments and behavioral intervention plans.  Fourth, a 
provision was added in favor of the use of positive behavioral interventions 
and supports for children with disabilities that impeded their learning or the 
learning of others.  Finally, parents’ role in the decision-making process was 
significantly strengthened.64  These changes were prompted by Congress’ 
fear of the growing population of students receiving special education 
services due to the expanding eligibility standard under IDEA.  This made 
Congress fear that the Act was no longer serving the “truly disabled” as 
Congress intended.65 
Congress, therefore, amended the definition of children “with a 
disability” by giving states the discretion to include children between the 
ages of three and nine experiencing “developmental delays” in the coverage 
of the statute.66  Young children may not exactly fit within categories of 
disabilities identified in IDEA and this possibly avoided problems associated 
with early mislabeling.  Congress urged the United States Department of 
Education and state agencies to carefully consider in every evaluation: the 
 
 59.  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192. 
 60.  Gordon, supra note 39, at 194; EAHCA, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
 61.  EAHCA, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
 62.  IDEA, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1142 (1990). 
 63.  Gordon, supra note 39, at 195. 
 64.  H. Rutherford Turnbull III, Brennan L. Wilcox & Matthew J. Stowe, A Brief Overview 
of Special Education Law with Focus on Autism, 32 J. OF AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 
479 (2002).  
 65.  Hensel, supra note 16, at 1150. 
 66.  Id. at 1151.  
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high rate of misdiagnoses based on race, mislabeling children who simply 
had not previously received proper academic support, and children with 
limited English proficiency.67 
IDEA was amended again in 2004 with eligibility concerns at the 
forefront.68  The amended statute required states to maintain policies and 
procedures designed to prevent the inappropriate overload, or 
disproportional representation by race and ethnicity of children as related to 
labeling a child as disabled.  The Act permitted LEAs to use up to 15% of 
federal funding to create “early intervening services” for students who were 
not identified as needing special education or related services, but who need 
additional academic and behavioral support to succeed in a general education 
environment.69  Congress hoped this would help distinguish children with 
different learning styles from children with disabilities, reduce special 
education referrals, and benefit the general classroom environment by 
reducing academic and behavioral problems.70  These amendments reflect a 
move towards recognizing neurodiversity by arming public schools with 
pluralistic resources.  This approach, however, is still based on treating 
students as typical or atypical learners with rights to consequently different 
qualities of education. 
The list of protected impairments under IDEA includes the following 
categories of disabilities: mental retardation, hearing impairments, speech or 
language impairments, visual impairments, serious emotional disturbance, 
autism, orthopedic impairments, traumatic brain injury, specific learning 
disabilities, and other health impairments.71  IDEA conditions federal 
funding on state compliance with the statute, particularly that every eligible 
child receives a FAPE by means of a uniquely tailored “individualized 
education program” (“IEP”).72  The IEP is a comprehensive plan created by 
a students’ “IEP team” of teachers, school officials, advocates and the 
student’s parents or guardians that tailors the student’s education based on a 
child’s individual circumstances. 
If there is a disagreement between the students’ parents or guardians and 
school officials, IDEA provides informal mediation.  If the mediation does 
not resolve the disagreement, there is a due process hearing before the state 
or LEA.  The losing party may seek redress in state or federal court.73  
Although IDEA implements many ways to provide disabled students with 
equal education, the amendments seem to focus on what is appropriate 
 
 67.  Hensel, supra note 16, at 1157. 
 68.  Id. at 1159.  
 69.  Id.  
 70.  H.R. Rep. No. 108-77 at 104 (2003). 
 71.  Hensel, supra note 16, at 1163.  
 72.  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 182. 
 73.  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 182.  
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more than what is substantively equal.  The Supreme Court of the United 
States’ decisions in the Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson 
Central School District v. Rowley74 and Endrew F. v Douglas County 
School District75 exemplify the type of education that the American 
government finds a duty to provide. 
In Rowley, the Supreme Court found that providing a specialized 
education to disabled children generated “. . . no additional requirement that 
the services so provided be sufficient to maximize each child’s potential 
commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.”76  Plaintiff 
Amy Rowley successfully completed kindergarten in a regular classroom 
because her IEP included the use of a hearing aid.  Plaintiff’s parents wanted 
a sign language interpreter in all her academic classes along with the other 
services proposed in her IEP.  The interpreter, school administrators, the 
district’s Committee on the Handicapped, and the New York Commissioner 
of Education denied the request because Rowley was “achieving 
educationally, academically, and socially without such assistance.”77  The 
Rowleys claimed that the administrator’s denial of the sign language 
interpreter constituted a denial of FAPE in the United District Court for the 
Southern District of New York.78 
The District Court assumed it possessed the responsibility to give 
content to the requirement of an “appropriate education.”  The court held that 
FAPE required that the potential of the disabled student be measured to her 
performance and that resulting differential be compared to the shortfall 
experienced by nondisabled students.79  Although Rowley performed better 
than the average child in her class and was advancing from grade to grade, 
the court found that her education under FAPE was causing a disparity in her 
true potential.80  A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit affirmed.  The Supreme Court, however, disagreed.81 
Although the Court agreed that Congress failed to substantively define 
an appropriate level of education for disabled students, it found an express 
definition for a “free appropriate public education.”  A FAPE includes 
special education and related services: a) provided at public expense, under 
public supervision and direction, and without charge; b) meeting the 
standards of the State educational agency; c) including an appropriate 
preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved; 
 
 74.  Id. at 203. 
 75.  Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 203. 
 76.  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198. 
 77.  Id. at 185. 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id. at 186. 
 80.  Id. at 185. 
 81.  Id. at 210. 
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and d) provided in conformity with the IEP.82  The Court concluded there 
was no duty to maximize students’ potential; rather, “if personalized 
instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the 
child to benefit from the instruction . . . the child is receiving a ‘free 
appropriate education’” and thus satisfied the statute.83 
In Rowley, the Dissent argued that providing some educational benefit 
was not enough to meet the unique needs of disabled children.84  Rowley 
understood less than half of what was said in the classroom and her 
opportunity to education was unarguably unequal to her fellow 
classmates.85  However, the Court reasoned that, when the EAHCA passed, 
Congress only intended to make public education available to disabled 
children who were previously excluded from the system.86  Against this 
backdrop, the Court read the statute to simply require states to provide 
meaningful access to education, which was satisfied if they provide a 
“basic floor of opportunity” to disabled students.87  The Rowley Court held 
that the school satisfied its obligation by providing Rowley with services 
that provided enough educational benefits to allow her to perform above 
average in a general classroom.88 
The Majority relied on PARC and Mills to explain that States had no 
imposed obligation beyond the requirement that handicapped children 
receive some form of specialized education services.89  The Court looked at 
Senate reports and legislative history to decide that disabled children receive 
an “appropriate education” when personalized educational services are 
provided, but the Court did “not think that such statements imply a 
congressional intent to achieve strict equality of opportunity or services.”90  
Therefore, the goal was not to provide each disabled child with an equal 
educational opportunity because “. . . public school systems undoubtedly 
differ from student to student . . . .  The requirement that States provide 
“equal” opportunities would thus seem to present an entirely unworkable 
standard . . . .”91  The Justices declined to establish a single test to determine 
if the level of education provided to disabled students was adequate under 
the law.92  As a result, after Rowley, federal courts developed their own twist 
 
 82.  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 192 (White, B., dissenting). 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. at 199. 
 87.  Id. at 200. 
 88.  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176. 
 89.  Id. at 197.  
 90.  Id. at 198. 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202. 
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on the substantive requirement under FAPE without maximizing disabled 
students’ potential to learn. 
Some courts, like the Tenth Circuit, bent the Court’s finding in Rowley 
to mean that states satisfied their duty to provide equal education to disabled 
students when students barely made some, or de minimis, progress.93  In 
Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District Re-1,94 the Supreme Court 
clarified that FAPE required more than de minimis progress.  The Court 
found that schools must provide students with an education “reasonably 
calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the 
child’s circumstances.”95  Plaintiff (“Endrew”) attended public school from 
preschool through fourth grade, when his academic and functional progress 
stalled.96  Endrew’s parents felt that he was not making meaningful 
progress due to the lack of advancement in the goals and objectives in his 
IEP.  They further contended that many objectives in Endrew’s IEP were 
discontinued or abandoned because he did not make adequate progress and 
the school district failed to adequately address his increased inability to 
access the educational environment.  Because the school district failed to 
conduct a functional behavioral assessment, implement appropriate 
positive behavioral support, or develop an appropriate behavioral 
improvement plan, Endrew enrolled in a private school specializing in the 
education of children with autism.97 
Endrew’s parents claimed that the school district failed provide an IEP 
that was reasonably calculated to provide Endrew with FAPE and sought 
reimbursement for the private school tuition and transportation costs.  The 
school district refused.  The administrative law judge ruled in favor of the 
school district, concluding that the proposed IEP was reasonably calculated 
to enable Endrew to receive educational benefits and, therefore, the IEP was 
not a denial of FAPE.98  The District Court of Colorado affirmed because 
Endrew made some minimal progress and “[i]n the court’s view, that was all 
Rowley demanded.”99  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed 
finding that Rowley stated that an IEP is adequate if it calculated to confer 
an educational benefit that is merely more than de minimis.100  The Supreme 
Court rejected the de minimis standard, but still held that Rowley imposed no 
 
 93.  Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 991 (emphasis added). 
 94.  Id. at 996. 
 95.  Id. at 993. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 997. 
 99.  Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 997. 
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explicit substantive standard, nor did it guarantee any level of education or 
potential outcome.101 
Again, the Court did not establish a duty to maximize the potential of 
students through education, disabled or not.  The American approach to 
equality in education only creates a minimal duty to ensure that disabled 
students are not excluded from access to basic public education and that their 
IEP is reasonably calculated to enable a student to make appropriate 
progress, not maximum progress.  The Court rejected Endrew’s parent’s 
argument that FAPE should provide disabled children “. . . opportunities to 
achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and contribute to society 
that are substantially equal to the opportunities afforded children without 
disabilities.”102  Instead, IDEA simply requires an educational program 
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light 
of the child’s circumstances.103 
Justice Roberts noted the factual differences between the plaintiffs in 
both Rowley and Endrew to show that what may be educationally appropriate 
for one studentm may not be appropriate for another, therefore, assessment 
should be child focused and not criterion or normative based.104  America, 
therefore, legally permits institutional isolation and educational disparity 
because equal education is not a right enjoyed by all students.  This shows 
that separate and unequal educational services are not unconstitutional by 
default.  Canada’s approach to equal education starkly differs because it 
rejects categorizing students in a typical versus atypical label within 
neurodiversity.  Canada instead compares disabled students’ access and 
progress to all children receiving education generally to ensure substantively 
equal education. 
III. Education in Canada 
Canada recognizes education as a right and takes a substantive approach 
to equality by recognizing a governmental duty to maximize student’s 
potential.  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom guarantees 
Canadian citizens’ right to education.105  Because English and French are 
both official languages of Canada, the Charter constitutionally guarantees 
 
 101.  Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000-01. 
 102.  Id. at 1001 (citation omitted). 
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Compare Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (holding that disabled students’ potential need not 
be maximized), and Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (holding that an educational program should 
be reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s 
circumstances). 
 105.  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, S 16 & 23, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (Can.). 
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access to education in either language.106  The Charter ensures that the 
government provides education to Canadian children in their parents’ 
primary language, even in areas where only a minority of residents speak 
that language.107  As a result, Canadian students have the constitutional right 
to attend classes taught in either first language French classes in provinces 
where French is not the majority language, or taught in English where 
English is not the majority language.  Education is a civil right because 
Canada recognizes that education is “necessary for the preservation and 
promotion” of communities and dignity of all students.108 
The Charter also guarantees equal rights stating every individual is “. . . 
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and 
benefit of the law . . . .”109  Unlike the United States, Canada has a 
substantive approach to equality—a focus on the effect or impact rather than 
treatment or discriminatory intent.  This approach to equality, along with the 
right to education, allows better development of diverse human potential that 
the United States would benefit from. 
A.  Equal Rights in Canada 
In Eldridge v. British Columbia,110 the Supreme Court of Canada 
provides the basis for equality rights for diverse cognitive groups.  
Appellants Robin Eldridge and Linda Warren were born deaf and wished to 
have the use of sign language interpreters with their doctors in hospitals 
covered by their health insurance.111  A private company supplied 
interpreters in the past, but this service was discontinued due to a lack of 
funding.112  Appellants claimed that the communication barrier between 
them and their doctors resulted in lesser quality of care, which infringed on 
their right to equal benefit of the law under the Charter.113  The Court 
unanimously held that the Charter protected equality rights to protect human 
dignity and rectify discrimination against disadvantaged groups.114  The 
Court held that British Columbia was obliged to provide translators to the 
deaf to provide equal access to core benefits accorded to everyone under the 
British Columbia healthcare scheme.115  Failing to provide ASL translators 
 
 106.  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 105. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Constitution Act 1982 S 15.1 (Can.). 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  [1997] 3 SCR 624. 
 111.  Id. at 625. 
 112.  Id. at 636. 
 113.  Id. at 636. 
 114.  Id. at 626. 
 115.  Id. at 690. 
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for the deaf effectively denied to one group of disabled people the benefit 
granted by law to other people.116 
In Auton v. British Columbia,117 the Court distinguished its holding in 
Eldridge when it held that access to a benefit that the law has not conferred 
to any group of people is not subject to the equality provision in the Charter.  
In Auton, four infant, autistic petitioners sued the government for not funding 
a behavioral therapy for all autistic children between the ages of three and 
six years old.118  The claimants needed to show unequal treatment under the 
law, specifically that they did not receive a benefit that the law provided to 
someone else.119  The promise of equality, therefore, had to be confined to 
benefits and burdens “of the law.”120  Petitioners argued that the unequal 
treatment stemmed from funding medically required treatments for children 
or adults with mental illness, while refusing to fund medically required 
therapy to autistic children.  The Court found, however, that the legislative 
scheme only provided that medically necessary treatment, or core services, 
are funded if they are “medically required.”121  In the end, the therapy in 
question was found only to be emergent in nature, not “medically necessary,” 
and, therefore, there was no discrimination.122  Still, the Court emphasized 
using a substantive and contextual approach to equality rather than a narrow, 
formalistic approach.123 
More importantly, the Court emphasized that equality is understood as a 
comparative concept requiring a claimant to point to some person who has 
been better treated in order to ground a claim.124  The Court rejected 
plaintiff’s attempts to compare autistic children to children suffering other 
disabilities.  Instead, the Court held that the appropriate comparator group 
was a non-disabled person who sought or received funding for a non-core 
therapy that was becoming recognized as medically required.125  This 
approach to neurodiversity is significant because the comparator groups look 
past distinctions separating people deemed to be typical or atypical.  This 
substantive approach to equality is what sets education equality in Canada 
apart from the categorically, separate education in the United States. 
 
 
 
 116.  Eldridge, 3 SCR at 690.  
 117.  Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (AG), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657. 
 118.  Id. at 663. 
 119.  Id. at 669. 
 120.  Id. at 671. 
 121.  Id. at 696. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Auton, 3 S.C.R. at 670. 
 124.  Lollini, supra note 3, at 19. 
 125.  Id. 
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B.  Equal Education in Canada 
In Moore v. British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
students with disabilities are entitled to necessary educational 
accommodations in order to access and benefit from public education.126  In 
this case, Jeffrey Moore had a learning disability that required intensive 
remediation to read.127  The North Vancouver School District provided 
Moore with a range of support services, but a funding shortage in the 
Province resulted in eliminating the program crucial to Moore’s education.128  
School officials advised Moore to attend private school for the remediation 
he required, but his parents had to pay for the remediation.129  Moore’s father 
filed a complaint on his behalf alleging that the school district and Province 
discriminated against him because of his disability and denied him a service 
customarily available to the public.130  The Human Rights Tribunal found 
the Province and school district’s actions unconstitutional.131  The Court of 
Appeal for British Columbia, however, overturned the Tribunal decision and 
held that there was no discrimination against Moore because he was not 
treated differently than other students with disabilities.132  Finally, the 
Supreme Court of Canada found it offensive that the Court of Appeals 
compared Moore only to students with disabilities and agreed with the 
Tribunal’s decision.133 
The Court held that the service Moore was entitled to under the British 
Columbia Human Rights Code was education generally, not special 
education specifically.134  The Canadian government, therefore, 
acknowledged that the reason children are entitled to an education is because 
a healthy democracy and economy require their educated contribution: 
 
This is because defining special education as the service at 
issue risks descending into a kind of ‘separate but equal 
approach’ . . . comparing [Moore] only with other special needs 
students would mean that the District could cut all special needs 
programs and yet be immune from a claim of discrimination . . . 
if compared only to other special needs students, full 
consideration cannot be given to whether he had meaningful 
 
 126.  Moore v. British Columbia, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 (Can.). 
 127.  Id. at 361.   
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Moore, 3. S.C.R. at 361. 
 133.  Id. at 362. 
 134.  Id. 
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access to education to which all students in British Columbia are 
entitled.135 
 
Moore holds that adequate special education is not a dispensable luxury 
because it provides access for children with disabilities to the statutory 
commitment to education made to all children.136  This holding that students 
with disabilities have an equal right to education as students without 
disabilities starkly contrasts to America’s approach to equal education. 
Conclusion 
Approaching equality with a focus on effect or impact, as in Canada, 
instead of treatment or discriminatory effect, as in the United States, compels 
a democracy to maximize the potential of every student rather than a typical 
few.  This approach better supports neurodiversity because a society has a 
duty to make education quality and access substantively equal rather than 
formally equal.  A democracy can better establish this approach to 
educational equality by considering education as a fundamental right and 
inherently rejecting a separate but equal analysis. 
Public education in the United States falls short of public education in 
Canada because America does not recognize education as a constitutional 
right and fails to find a duty to maximize every students’ potential.  Canada, 
on the other hand, provides the same type of educational standards for every 
student, not only because it is just, but because it is a function of democracy.  
Canada, therefore, approaches equal education to be maximizing every 
students’ potential.  This approach makes use of neurodiversity because it 
maximizes the ability of all learners, whether they are atypical or not. 
The government has the means to provide people with foundational tools 
to compete and contribute to society with equal advantage through public 
education.137  When American public schools institutionally isolate 
vulnerable students who have atypical cognitive performance or learning 
styles, it harms its own democracy.138  High rates of children of color 
enrolled in special education with either undiagnosed or untreated language 
and learning disabilities reflect the discriminatory and ignorant reality of the 
American public school system.139  Additionally, many disabled youth in the 
 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Moore, 3. S.C.R. at 362. 
 137.  Imoukhuede, supra note 2, at 48. 
 138.  Hensel, supra note 16, at 1147–48. 
 139.  Shameka Stanford & Bahiyyah Muhammad, The Confluence of Language and Learning 
Disorders and the School-To-Prison Pipeline Among Minority Students of Color: A Critical Race 
Theory, 26 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 691, 698 (2018). 
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American juvenile justice and criminal justice systems are deprived of an 
appropriate education that could disrupt the school-to-prison pipeline.140 
Because Congress only intended to make public education available to 
disabled children who were previously excluded from the system, the 
government does not find a duty to maximize disabled students’ potential.  
Education is not a fundamental right, therefore, providing equal education 
for disabled students is not an integral service available.  Instead, providing 
disabled students with unequal education suffices because they will make 
appropriate progress.  As a result, disabled students in American public 
schools do not have a right to maximize their human potential and 
contribute to society. 
America appears to treat education as a service rather than a right.  This 
contributes to the vague governmental duty to educate individual students 
differently based on categorizing students as disabled or not, making a 
typical versus atypical distinction.  This duty promotes separate, unequal, 
and different educational opportunities for students with disabilities.141  
Canada, on the other hand, renounces the “separate but equal” inquiry for 
disabled students because all students have an equal right to education.142  
This is because Canada finds a governmental duty to meaningfully maximize 
every student’s potential regardless of disability.143  These two approaches 
reflect contrasting governmental commitments to incorporate neurodiversity 
into the democracy; an incorporation that benefits both individuals and 
societies at large. 
 
 
 
 140.  Cortiella & Horowitz, supra note 8.  
 141.  Rowley, 458 U.S. at 199. 
 142.  Moore, 3 S.C.R. at 360. 
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